Researchers Publish 131-Page Security Analysis of Bitcoin's Post-Quantum SHRINCS Proposal
Researchers release security analysis of SHRINCS and ask for help finding flaws
A team of researchers has published a 131-page security analysis of SHRINCS, a proposed way to protect Bitcoin signatures against quantum computers. Researcher Mikhail Kudinov announced the first version on Thursday in a thread on X. He said the paper reduces SHRINCS' security to the properties of the hash function it is built on.
The team is now asking the wider crypto community to review the work and look for mistakes. Kudinov said the analysis has not been sufficiently peer reviewed, and the project's GitHub repository warns that the documents may contain errors and should not be the only basis for deploying SHRINCS.
Key numbers and open questions
- The analysis is dated Nov. 18 and runs 131 pages.
- It estimates classical security of 121.4 to 122.7 bits for SHRINCS.
- Those figures rest on assumptions, including three unproven conjectures.
- Kudinov said the work is not finished. The team is still analyzing a property called SM-DSPR, tightening a reprogramming step, and improving a bound against quantum attackers.
How the SHRINCS signature scheme works
SHRINCS is a hash-based scheme. Its security rests on hash functions instead of the elliptic curve math behind today's Bitcoin signatures. Hash functions are mathematical tools that turn data into a fixed string of characters.
The design puts two systems under one key. A stateful part is built on FXMSS with WOTS+C, and a stateless fallback is built on SLH-DSA. Because both use the same hash function, Kudinov said, the security proof has to cover both.
Signature size is the main cost. Under the draft proposal, stateful SHRINCS signatures run from 548 to 4,619 bytes, while the stateless fallback is 5,777 bytes. Bitcoin's Schnorr signatures today are 64 bytes, and ECDSA signatures are typically around 71 bytes. Larger signatures take up more scarce block space, so fewer transactions fit into each block.
The danger of reusing a one-time key
The smaller, stateful path carries a serious risk. It relies on one-time keys. If a wallet — the software that stores and sends bitcoin — accidentally reuses one, an attacker could forge a signature for that address and steal the funds. Wallet software must therefore track the state of every key. The stateless path avoids this problem but produces much larger signatures.
Jonas Nick, Blockstream's director of research, told Isabel Foxen Duke, head of the MARA Foundation, on MARA Foundation TV that wallets must automatically fall back to the stateless path whenever a state counter could be compromised. "It needs to be impossible for the user to behave in a way that this catastrophic event happens," he said. "Wallet developers need to deal with this stateful component correctly."
Nick also warned about the effect of large signatures on the network. "We don't know what the fee market will look like once we have these very big signatures," he said. "And it's not just the fee market, it's also just fewer transactions fit into a block, meaning fewer people can use Bitcoin. And I think this changes the value proposition of Bitcoin."
What the researchers want checked
Kudinov, a post-quantum cryptography researcher at Blockstream, asked readers to open an issue on GitHub if they find a mistake. "We tried to be careful, but a proof of this size can have mistakes," he wrote. The draft Bitcoin Improvement Proposal for SHRINCS is also open for comment.
"We need all the possible feedback — engineers, cryptographers, protocol developers," Kudinov said. "There are a lot of things to check, test, complain about, or praise."
The team also produced two results that apply beyond SHRINCS: a classical bound for a property called ITSR without reprogramming, and a quadratic quantum bound for undetectability. Kudinov said these also apply to SPHINCS+ and SLH-DSA, the hash-based schemes SHRINCS borrows from, and that they were published as separate papers.
Why quantum resistance is on Bitcoin's agenda
The SHRINCS work arrives as quantum risk draws more attention. A global securities regulators' group this week warned that moving blockchains to quantum-resistant cryptography may be especially hard. Researchers also recently built a post-quantum defense for the Lightning Network, a system for faster bitcoin payments, after Bitcoin's first quantum-safe transaction was shown without a fork.